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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
LIND

Case No. 970747-CA
Priority No. 2

t,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to withdraw

her no contest plea for class A misdemeanor attempted theft. The State is entitled to
appeal this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(g) (Supp. 1997). This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the district court have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a no
contest plea made more than thirty days after entry of the plea?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
The State preserved this issue by timely objecting to the district court's grant of
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, on the ground that the motion was untimely

1

(R. 63). Moreover, this case presents a jurisdictional issue, which may be raised at any
time. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 583-84 (Utah App. 1992).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw a plea
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Child Support
Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah App. 1994) (whether court has subject matter
jurisdiction is question of law).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995)
(1)
(2)

(3)

A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged in a September 1, 1995 information with theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code .Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 05). On September
15, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to attempted theft, a
class A misdemeanor, with the plea to be held in abeyance pending a determination of
how much restitution defendant should be assessed and full payment of that restitution (R.
18-22, 26-27, 47-49, 52, 54-55). On November 6, 1997, the district court permitted
2

defendant to withdraw her plea over the State's objection (R. 30, 63-64). The written
order was entered on December 1, 1997 (R. 31; Addendum A).
The State filed its notice of appeal on December 5, 1997 (R. 33).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Between August 10th and September 7th, 1994, defendant, without authorization,
deposited into her personal bank account three checks belonging to her former employer,
Cook's Books2 (R. 05-06, 19, 54-55). The amount of the checks totaled $1,530.28 (R. 26,
61). Based on these facts, the State charged defendant with third degree felony theft3 (R.
05-06).
On September 15, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to
a reduced charge of class A misdemeanor attempted theft, with the plea to be held in
abeyance (R. 05-06, 19, 26, 46, 52). Before taking the plea, the district court engaged in a
brief colloquy with defendant regarding her rights and her understanding of the plea
agreement (R. 50-52). Defendant also signed in open court a plea affidavit that stated she
!

The facts relating to defendant's conduct are based on the probable cause
statement in the information, factual statements in the plea affidavit and plea in abeyance
agreement, and on factual representations made to the court by both parties.
Apparently, the checks had been sent to defendant from customers who had
bought goods from Cook's Books through defendant (R. 48, 55). Instead of forwarding
the checks on to Cook's Books, defendant endorsed and deposited them into her own
account (R. 48, 55).
3

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (Supp. 1997) which classifies theft of
property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $5,000 as a third degree felony.
3

knew and understood that if she desired to withdraw her plea, she must do so by filing a
motion within thirty days after entry of her plea (R. 22; Addendum B at 5; R. 55). The
plea affidavit contained defense counsel's certification that defendant had either read the
statements in her plea affidavit or had them read to her and that counsel had discussed the
affidavit with her and believed that she was mentally and physically competent and that
she understood the meaning of the affidavit's contents (R. 23; Addendum B at 6).
Defendant claimed that she appropriated the checks because her former employer
owed her commissions for sales that she had made while working for the company (R.
55). Therefore, the written "plea in abeyance" agreement provided for a restitution
hearing at which the court would determine whether Cook's Books owed defendant any
money and, if so, how much (R. 26; Addendum C). The agreement stated that if the
district court determined that Cook's Books owed defendant $1,530.28 or more, then
defendant would pay no restitution to her former employer and the plea in abeyance could
be withdrawn and the case dismissed six months after entry of the plea (R. 26). However,
in the event defendant owed money to Cook's Books, she would be ordered to pay that
amount within a time period to be agreed upon by the parties (R. 27). After any
restitution had been paid in full, defendant would be allowed to withdraw her plea and the
case would be dismissed (R. 27).
At defendant's request, the restitution hearing was set for November 6, 1997, more
than thirty days later, to give defendant time to gather evidence regarding how much her
4

former employer owed her (R. 53). At the restitution hearing, defendant represented to
the court that after offsetting the monies owed her by her former employer, she owed the
company $687.00 in restitution4 (R. 61). Despite this information, the court stated that
the case appeared to be a simple accounting matter between the parties that should be
resolved civilly (R.62). The court expressed its discomfort with allowing defendant's
plea to stand under the circumstances (R. 62, 66-67).
Arguing that the offset made it clear that she did not have the requisite criminal
intent to commit theft, defendant moved to withdraw her plea (R. 64). The State objected
on the ground that more than thirty days had passed since defendant entered her plea and
that Utah Code Ann.§ 77-13-6(2) and State v. Price, 873 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992)
prohibited the grant of defendant's motion (R. 63-64). The court acknowledged, in effect,
that there was a thirty-day limitation period for withdrawing a guilty or no contest plea
and that this period had passed (R. 64). The court nevertheless granted defendant's
motion, stating that it believed there was good cause for allowing the withdrawal (R. 64).

4

This representation was actually made in a previous off-the-record discussion
between the parties and the court (R. 60-62). The district court summarized the prior
discussion for the record (R. 60-62). The State does not concede the accuracy of the
$687.00 figure.
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendant moved to withdraw her no contest plea more than thirty days
after she entered her plea, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider her
motion. Accordingly, the district court's grant of defendant's motion should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER PLEA BECAUSE THE
MOTION WAS MADE MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER
ENTRY OF THE PLEA.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1995) provides that a guilty or no contest plea "may
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court," and that a
motion to withdraw such a plea "shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea."
This Court has held that "if a defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is
entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw filed after the
thirty-day period." State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Price,
837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 n.2
(Utah 1993) (implying that if defendant does not move to withdraw plea within 30 days,
any available remedy may only be sought through post-conviction proceedings).
In other words, so long as the defendant has been informed of the thirty-day
limitation period, that period is jurisdictional. Once it has passed without a motion to
6

withdraw, the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider whether good cause for the
withdrawal exists. Canfield. 917 P.2d at 562; Price. 837 P.2d at 583.
In this case, defendant was informed of the thirty-day limitation period in her plea
affidavit, which she executed in open court after a brief colloquy with the judge (R. 22,
50-52). Defendant did not move to withdraw her no contest plea until nearly two months
after its entry (R. 31, 62). The trial court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to even
consider defendant's motion, must less grant it.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
trial court's granting of defendant's motion to withdraw her no contest plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jX* day of

Mto/

1998.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

.AURA B. DUPAi:
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this /2*-1 day of

Utu/

, 1998,1 caused to be

mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, two accurate and correct copies of the
foregoing appellant's brief to counsel for appellee, JOAN WATT and LYNN R.
BROWN, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South #300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111.
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ADDENDUM A
Order Allowing Defendant to Withdraw Her Plea

%

TWr

3«.--d.oia: jjctrict

LYNN R. BROWN, #0460
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

DE

W 1997

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ALLOWING
DEFENDANT TO
WITHDRAW NO CONTEST
PLEA IN ABEYANCE

v.
LINDA KALMAR,
Defendant.

Case no.

971900756FS

JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

Pursuant to the defendants motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that her plea In
abeyance to a Class A Theft that was entered on September 15, 1997 Is withdrawn. After
reviewing the material and discussing the matter with Emle Jones, Deputy District Attorney
and defendants attorney, Lynn R. Brown, the Court on the motion of the defendant
terminates the plea in abeyance and declines to enter judgement against her.
DATED this _ ? ^ 2 = r d a y T J f K o v e m b e r , 1997.

HONORABLH5AV1ID S.
Third District Court)

ADDENDUM B
Plea Affidavit
(Statement of Defendant and Certificate of Counsel and Order)

IN T H E D I S T R I C T C O U R T OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T
S T A T E Qp U T A H

Third Judfcial District

SEP 1 5 1397
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENI
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

//vu3a

Case No.

Kzyyufi'V

FS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, A * * x ^

khwi'V'

, the defendant in this case

and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guiltyMno contestHo the following crime(s):

CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

A. t-rfot
B.

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it,
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading
(guiltynno contest).

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:

jjtruHi /tt-

Jr<Ypg^

kaJhU, ^

Jm oifr^

tfo

QUA—*

<^//^e

JeJu,

~Xer?«sqfr A •a*

s

f^>

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable,
that

constitutes

the

elements

of

the

crime(s)

charged

are

as

follows:

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount,
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
(have not) (Wave) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following
reasons:

2

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and

understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty.
4.
L\Lw*> yf.

If

I have

not

waived

my right to counsel, my

attorney is

, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement,

my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5. I know that i have a right to a trial by jury.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense
to testify in court upon by behalf.
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to
do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be

3

paid by the state.
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to
which I plead ^\m^r(r\o

contest)/ I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an

offense that carries V-f^hiTmum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself
to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense.

I know that the

sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know
that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by Utah
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by
the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am
on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also
know that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.
13. My plea(s) of (guHfy) too c o n t e s t ^ ) (is not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions.
of this plea bargain, is any, are gully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this

4

affidavit.
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty)
(no contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my
plea.
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the court may do are also not binding on the court.
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the
attached plea agreement, have been made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had i read to me by my attorney, and
I understand its provisions.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything

contained in this statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. lam

fjh

Years of age; I have attended school through t h e ^ / ^

and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s).
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which

5

impair my judgment.
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this /£~

day of &fj

, 1

&7.

j ^ t & &L

DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for ^ ^ 4 ^

/%/n^Af)

, the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct
are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

'/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

6

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
jhsitZL* /fti&ts^j?

, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of

the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of
the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or
coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are
fully contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR #

7

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification
of the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the
defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in
the statement be accepted and entered.

DONE IN COURT this /jf

day of

8

<^f

, 19 J*1.

ADDENDUM C
Agreement for Plea in Abeyance

Thiro juvvciai District

SEP 1 5 1997
AGREEMENT FOR PLEA IN ABEYANCE

/
/ / r £ A L T LAKE COUNTY

In accordance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code §77
2a-2,3 sr. 4. Linda Kaimar, by and through her attorney, Lynn R. Brown and the State by
and through Its attorney Bmie )ones and with the approval of this Court, enter Into the
following agreement for a plea in abeyance:
1.

The defendant will enter a no contest plea to Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor.

2.

At the time Linda Kaimar enters a no contest plea, the attorney for the State,

Ernie ]ones and the attorney for Linda Kaimar, Lynn R. Brown will move the Court to hold
the plea in abeyance and not enter a judgment of conviction nor impose sentence pending
the completion of this agreement. Linda Kaimar waives her right to have sentence imposed
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3.

It is understood by the parties, that the issue to be resolved by this agreement

and plea in abeyance is whether or not Linda Kaimar owes any restitution to her former
employer, Cooks Books, for having deposited three checks into her personal checking account
in the total amount of $1,530.28.
4.

To resolve the question of restitution, it is agreed that the Court may set a

restitution hearing date and allow the parties at thattimeto present evidence to support their
claims.
5.

If the Court determines at a restitution hearing that Linda Kaimar has money

owing to her by Cooks Books In the amount of $1,530.28 or more then it Is agreed that.
Mrs. Kaimar will pay no restitution to Cooks Books and the plea In abeyance may be
withdrawn and the case dismissed by the Court, after at least 6 months has expired from the

n \.

date of the entry of the plea.
6.

If the Court determines at the restitution hearing that Linda Kalmar owes any

amount to Cooks Books, then Mrs. Kalmar will be ordered to pay the determined amount
within a specified time frame to be agreed upon by the parties. After completing the
payment of restitution as ordered by the Court, the plea in abeyance may be withdrawn and
the case dismissed.
7.

If at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, Linda Kalmar

violated any conditions, the Court may order her appearance to show cause why the
agreement should not be terminated, if it is determined after an evidentiary hearing that
Mrs. Kalmar has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of this agreement,
the Court may terminate the agreement and enter judgement and conviction and impose
sentence against her for the offense to which the original plea was entered.
This agreement entered into this

(h

day of September, 1997.

ERNIC JONES, Deputy

LMAR, Defendant

I M N R. BROWN, Attorney for Defendant
The terms and conditions as
provided in this agreement,,
are approved by the Court ""'':,.

A AZ: \ \

